Jiahd in the Global Village: Al-Qaeda\u27s Digital Radicalization and Recruitment Campaign by Cannata, Katie
Theses Honors College
11-2014
Jiahd in the Global Village: Al-Qaeda's Digital
Radicalization and Recruitment Campaign
Katie Cannata
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Critical and Cultural
Studies Commons, International and Intercultural Communication Commons, Journalism Studies
Commons, Mass Communication Commons, Public Relations and Advertising Commons, Social
Influence and Political Communication Commons, and the Speech and Rhetorical Studies
Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Cannata, Katie, "Jiahd in the Global Village: Al-Qaeda's Digital Radicalization and Recruitment Campaign" (2014). Theses. Paper 22.
  
 
 
 
 
 
JIHAD IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AL-QAEDA’S DIGITAL 
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN 
By 
Katie Cannata 
 
 
 
Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
for the designation of Department Honors  
Journalism and Media Studies 
Dr. Paul Traudt 
Dr. Julian Kilker 
Dr. Andrew Hanson 
Greenspun College of Urban Affairs 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 November 14, 2014 
 
  
JIHAD IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AL-QAEDA’S DIGITAL  
 
 
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 
ABSTRACT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
Al-Qaeda’s New Media Campaign - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 
 
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining Terrorism and Jihad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 
Theories of Terrorist Activities - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 
Propaganda and Radicalization Theories and Techniques  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14 
Al-Qaeda’s Online Presence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22 
 
CHAPTER THREE – METHODS  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28 
 
CHAPTER FOUR – RESULTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 33 
 
CHAPTER FIVE - DISCUSSION 
General Discussion  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 37 
Implications - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 42 
 
REFRENCES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 46 
 
APPENDIXES  
Appendix A  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 52 
Appendix B  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 53 
Appendix C  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 54 
Appendix D  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 55 
  
JIHAD IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AL-QAEDA’S DIGITAL  
 
 
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This study wouldn’t have been possible without the kind support and 
patience of my thesis committee. I’d first like to extend my sincere gratitude to Dr. 
Paul Traudt, whose expertise and thoughtful encouragement kept me motivated and 
on track throughout the course of this study.  Special thanks are also in order for Dr. 
Julian Kilker, who provided a wealth of resources that benefited my research and 
insatiable curiosity on the topic, and for Dr. Andrew Hanson, who offered insight 
and clarity whenever it was needed.  This thesis serves as a springboard towards 
future academic endeavors, and I’m very fortunate to have received such valuable 
guidance throughout the process.  
 
  
JIHAD IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AL-QAEDA’S DIGITAL  
 
 
4 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Following America’s “War on Terror,” al-Qaeda and its affiliates became highly 
decentralized in terms of organizational and media operations. Though mass media 
outlets continue to play a significant role in drawing attention to al-Qaeda’s transnational 
campaign, Salafi Jihadists have recently begun to rely on new media for purposes of 
legitimization and promotion. The Internet serves as a suitable platform for these groups’ 
media objectives since it is inherently anonymous and absent of censorship. Most 
importantly, the Internet facilitates al-Qaeda in reaching a global audience, which is made 
evident by the growing amount of Salafi Jihadist media that is translated or created for 
English speakers. The latter change may seem paradoxical to the groups’ anti-Western 
sentiment, but it underscores an important shift in al-Qaeda’s recruitment strategies. The 
proliferation of English content promoting the Salafi Jihadist cause may imply that al-
Qaeda is shifting its attention towards the Muslim diaspora in the West with the intent to 
recruit, radicalize, and promote acts of terror. 
 This study analyzed a variety of online publications that were disseminated by al-
Qaeda and similar Salafi Jihadist groups. The sample included speech and video 
transcripts, digital magazines, and articles that were analyzed for the intent to radicalize 
readers through the employment of Albert Bandura’s eight mechanisms of moral 
disengagement. The analysis provided substantial support for the latter claim, indicating 
that many of the digital publications disseminated by Salafi Jihadist groups are intended 
to both radicalize and recruit readers through the promotion of moral disengagement. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
Al-Qaeda’s New Media Campaign 
Since the United States declared its “War on Terror,” the structure and strategies 
of terrorist organizations have undergone transformative changes. Today, the al-Qaeda 
network that successfully executed the atrocities of 9/11 has become highly decentralized 
as an organization in terms of location and leadership. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the group’s ideology is disseminated any less than it was before the United 
States heightened its presence in the region. While al-Qaeda has been dispersed around 
the Arabian Peninsula, the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Horn of Africa in terms of on-
the-ground operations, the reach of its Salafi Jihadist ideology has been bolstered by new 
technologies. After decades of relying on rural localities, Islamic organizations, student 
groups and face-to-face communication for purposes of recruitment and support, 
potential members are now being attracted to the jihadist movement by means of 
websites, social media pages and online forums. Individuals who were once far from the 
influence of Salafi Jihadism can now become active and willing participants in the 
group’s virtual umma — or community — from the privacy of their bedrooms. 
Until recently, terrorist cells were largely dependent on mass media outlets in 
order to garner attention to their radical ideology and global mission. However, with the 
advent of new media technologies came a new sense of independence for al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates’ international media campaign. Today, Salafi Jihadist groups have harnessed 
the ability to disseminate information and communicate with an international audience 
independent of mass media organizations. This newly found freedom allows such groups 
to share information that would have otherwise been censored or deemed dangerous to 
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the public or state governments. Because of the Internet’s interactive, uncensored, and 
pervasive nature as a medium, jihadists’ presence has become increasingly accessible to a 
wider global audience. Though it may seem paradoxical to the anti-Western sentiment 
that is found at the core of Salafi Jihadism, a substantial amount of the jihadists’ 
electronic media is created or translated for the English speaking, Muslim diaspora. This 
development in al-Qaeda’s media campaign compels one to wonder whether these 
electronic forms of jihadi media are created with the intent to radicalize and recruit 
individuals beyond the region’s borders; and if so, could such messages of moral 
disengagement and reinforcement of Salafi Jihadist attitudes potentially influence 
individuals to carry out acts of terror? 
The following chapter examines the ways institutions and scholars have defined 
terrorism and jihad over time. The origins of modern, international terrorism and Salafi 
Jihadism are then addressed in order to set al-Qaeda’s current operations and campaign in 
its appropriate, historical context. Because this study will pay particular attention to the 
propaganda techniques being employed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, common tactics 
and methods of persuasion are also explored. However, the implications of exposure to 
propaganda are of additional interest to this study. Therefore, social learning theory is 
used to suggest propaganda’s potential effects upon behavior and attitude formation 
among sympathizers. The literature review concludes with a brief overview of al-Qaeda’s 
online presence both before and after 9/11, provided by previous research that has 
examined the uses, benefits, and dangers of digital jihadist media.  
The third chapter delineates this paper’s method for analyzing Salafi Jihadist 
propaganda by first defining content analysis, which is followed by the advantages and 
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process of conducting a qualitative research for the purposes of understanding political, 
social, and cultural phenomenon. The eight measurements that were used throughout the 
analysis are then defined, which leads into the study’s three working hypotheses. The 
chapter concludes by addressing the limitations of convenience sampling, which is 
necessary for this study due to language barriers and issues with accessing sensitive 
content.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining Terrorism and Jihad 
Though a definition of terrorism has yet to be fully agreed upon by states and 
global institutions, the term commonly denotes the use of violence and intimidation for 
political means. Terrorism has been referred by a 2004 United Nations Security Council 
resolution as: 
…criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature 
. . . (2). 
 
Another definition provided by the United States Department of State that can be found 
within Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d) also mentions politically motivated, 
violent tactics that are intended to intimidate a population. However, unlike the 2004 UN 
resolution, the definition underscores that the violent acts being perpetrated are “usually 
intended to influence an audience” (2010).  The political motivation behind acts of terror 
has also compelled scholars to suggest that terrorism functions as a form of 
communication. According to political psychologist John Horgan, what sets terrorism 
apart from other violent acts is the nature of its victims; the immediate victims of attacks 
are often unassociated with those who hold positions of political power, thus rendering 
them to serve the purpose of conveying the terrorists’ message to the intended receiver — 
state leaders and governments (2005). The victim is entirely arbitrary when it comes to 
acts of terrorism. In cases of Salafi Jihadism, they are only targeted to express the 
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terrorists’ political opposition and discontent towards what they perceive as the Western 
contamination. 
 Beyond the semantic uncertainty surrounding the term, it is also of importance to 
differentiate between distinct forms of terrorism. The most common categorizations 
include state-sponsored and non-state actor acts of terror. The latter form contains 
subcategories of domestic or international application, which is dependent upon the 
population being targeted by the non-state actors (Weimann & Winn, 1994). Because al-
Qaeda and its Salafi Jihadist affiliates operate transnationally, they can be categorized as 
both domestic and international terrorist organizations. However, the groups’ global 
mission often designates their actions as international terrorism, because they seek to 
influence a much broader audience than those being victimized (Weimann & Winn, 
1994).  
There has also been contention among some scholars regarding the way the term 
‘terrorism’ is employed by Western governments and media. This cohort’s argument rests 
upon the notion that Western officials and media outlets — most notably of the United 
States — only apply the term to violent acts carried out against themselves or their allies. 
Among this cohort are scholars Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, who are 
frequently cited for their work Manufacturing Consent. Throughout the book, Chomsky 
and Herman argue that American media propagate U.S. interests by means of editorial 
distortion (Chomsky & Herman, 1988). Both have also voiced similar suggestions about 
the government and media’s use of the term ‘terrorism.’ Within his study “The Semantics 
of Terrorism,” Herman suggests that instances of state-sponsored violence often occur 
without ever being addressed as acts of terrorism, and that the lack of recognition tends to 
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“confine the word’s application to non-state acts of intimidation for political ends” (2000, 
p. 3). He additionally notes that this failure stems from the fact that the governments 
carrying out acts of terror are often closely aligned with the West, and usually resort to 
violence for protecting transnational corporate interests (Herman, 2000). Chomsky raises 
a similar issue with the U.S.’s inconsistent application of the term.  According to 
Chomsky, an acceptable definition is difficult to establish when, if used, the definition 
implies that “the United States has been a leading agent in terror,” which would 
presumably be considered as “an unacceptable conclusion” (2007, p. 44). He supports 
this notion by citing America’s aggression in Nicaragua under the Reagan presidency, 
which was condemned by both the International Criminal Court and the United Nations 
Security Council more than once for being an “unlawful use of force” (Chomsky, 2007, 
p. 44). The clear problem in the case of deciding on a binding definition of terrorism is 
thus the “rejection of one of the most elementary principles: that we apply to ourselves 
the same standards as we do to others, if not more stringent ones” (2007, p. 45).  
For the purposes of this study, terrorism will be defined as the use of violence or 
intimidation tactics for the purpose of achieving politically-motivated goals, while 
garnering a response among audiences of both victims and sympathizers.  
‘Jihad’ is also an ambiguous term. In many ways, its meaning has been tarnished 
by terrorist organizations that use the term to justify their ideological and political 
mission. The origins of jihad can be traced to the Arabic word “jahada,” meaning to 
strive against anything considered ungodly or evil (Okon, 2013).  Differentiations are 
often made between two forms of jihad, the internal and external. While the internal is 
centered on the individual striving to overcome desires and temptations, the external 
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denotes a collective obligation to wage holy war against infidels in order to secure the 
Islamic umma (Gould, 2005; Okon, 2013; Janbek, 2011).   
Violent jihadist ideology has its origins in Salafism, which draws upon traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence to justify jihad as a communal obligation for all Muslims (Bhui & 
Ibrahim, 2013; Stemman, 2006; Sageman, 2004). The militant form of Salafism that has 
taken prominence on the world stage promotes a return to authentic Islam enforced by 
Shari’a law, while condoning the use of violent jihad in order to defeat both local and 
foreign heretics accused of preventing the establishment of a true Islamic state (Sageman, 
2004; Lewis, 2013). This fighting version of Salafism rests at the core of al-Qaeda’s 
global jihadist ideology, which prioritizes combating the far enemy rather than the near 
enemy of regional regimes (Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013; Sagemen, 2004). The tendency 
towards a global mission, rather than one that focuses on the groups’ immediate 
environment, is rooted in the external jihad’s conception of human society being divided 
into two, geo-religious spheres: Dar al-Islam — the land of Islam — and Dar al-harb, 
which signifies the land of conflict and unbelievers (Okon, 2013; Sagemen, 2004). 
According to Salafi Jihadism, it is the Muslim umma’s duty to expand the borders of Dar 
al-Islam so societies can live in a state of religious truth and just social order (Okon, 
2013; Sagemen 2004).  
 
Theories of Terrorist Activities  
Throughout history, terrorist activities have swept across societies in waves. 
According to UCLA Professor Emeritus of Political Science David Rapoport, each wave 
is defined by the political themes of its time (2014). The first wave, often referred to as 
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the Anarchist wave, marked the first instance of modern, international terror with its 
beginnings in Russia during the late 19
th
 century (Rapoport, 2012). The end of the 
Anarchist wave ushered in the anti-colonial wave of the 1920s, which introduced 
organizations including Israel’s Lehi group and the Irish Republican Army (Rapoport, 
2012). The third, “New Left” wave was first defined by the Vietnam War and the Viet 
Cong’s guerilla warfare tactics, but quickly found its way into the Western world with 
groups such as the American Weather Underground, the Italian Red Brigades and the 
West German Red Army Faction (Rapoport, 2012). Along with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), third wave terrorist organizations had their sights set on the West, 
with America as a primary target for aggression; in fact one-third of the third wave’s 
attacks involved American targets, largely because of the nation’s support of repressive 
regimes in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia (Rapoport, 2012). Unlike the first 
and second waves, the third drew lasting attention to the issue of terrorism from both 
global and state institutions; the UN adopted numerous conventions throughout the 
course of the third wave that deemed certain acts including hijacking and financing 
international terrorist activities as crimes (Rapoport, 2012).  
The fourth and current wave was launched in the late 1970s by a series of events 
that took place in the Islamic world (Rapoport, 2012). Sparked by the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979, fourth wave terrorism became rapidly rooted in the region’s religion (Rapoport, 
2012). The Mujahedeen’s victory over the Soviets in 1989 may have been the most 
significant event of the fourth wave, since the invasion drew together various bands of 
militant Islamists for the first time (Sageman, 2004). From the Mujahedeen’s perspective, 
Islam had been the force that drove out the secular Soviets, whose decline as superpower 
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provided new swaths of Muslim-populated lands to serve as fertile ground for recruiting 
and training Islamic rebels (Rapoport, 2012). The Mujahedeen’s victory also compelled 
the militant groups to identify and analyze other common problems (Sageman, 2004). 
Though the movement was transnational from its beginning by attracting Mujahedeen 
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, their success against the Soviets spurred a more 
refined, global perspective when it came to setting targets and defining their mission 
(Sageman, 2004). Rather than focusing on local Muslim leaders who were considered 
puppets of the Western world order, the Mujahedeen set their primary focus on waging 
jihad against the source of regional corruption — the world’s only remaining superpower, 
the United States (Sageman, 2004).  
Though modern terrorism seems to have its origins in the late 19
th
 century, some 
scholars claim that today’s terrorism tactics originated in the 20th century. In his work on 
modern terror, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins points to the methods of guerilla warfare 
that were gaining attention in the 1900s — particularly those being employed by Mao 
Zedong. According to Jenkins, the Chinese communist revolutionary popularized the use 
of military tactics by those lacking political influence or armies (1983). Mao encouraged 
a people’s war of revolutionaries to defeat the state’s stronger military force with the 
intention of mobilizing citizens who would normally remain uninvolved in a military 
conflict (Jenkins, 1983). From Mao’s perspective, guerrilla warfare was intended to 
generate a response and change of attitude among the public; any physical damage 
experienced by the enemy thus became a secondary achievement — the first was citizens’ 
response to witnessing the violence of guerrilla warfare (Jenkins, 2013). By drawing on 
Mao Zedong and his use of guerrilla tactics throughout the Chinese communist revolution, 
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Jenkins seems to imply that tactics and motives of terrorism saw an important shift in the 
20
th
 century — many of which can be found in jihadism today. A group’s primary 
motivation is no longer one of solely affecting institutions to garner a response; rather it’s 
to generate a reaction among a specific audience.  
Much of the aforementioned research suggests that terrorism is a political 
phenomenon that can occur in any country or culture. However, some scholars of 
international relations find what is referred to as ‘fourth wave terrorism’ to be indicative 
of the current state of Islam. Bassam Tibi, an international relations professor who has 
extensively studied the political dimension of Islam, proposes that jihadi-inspired 
terrorism is only one issue surrounding the larger problem of politicized Islam (2005). 
What Tibi considers as a “return to the sacred” can be linked to a number of structural 
causes, such as the economic and demographic state of the region, but cultural aspects 
including both identity and political crises are also major factors (2005, p. 248). Together, 
the structural and cultural crises serve as the foundation of politicized Islam (Tibi, 2005). 
In addition to Islam’s claim of universality, both crises have caused the religion to 
become a religiously-driven internationalism; jihadism is only one expression of the 
current state of politicized Islam, despite being the most successful in attracting global 
attention to its mission of de-Westernization (Tibi, 2005). 
 
Propaganda and Radicalization Theories and Techniques 
Salafi Jihadists are not the first, and presumably will not be the last, to use 
religious rhetoric as a method of legitimizing politically motivated actions. Throughout 
history, religions have been effective vehicles for propaganda, especially when it comes 
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to disseminating political and social ideas (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006). The term 
propaganda became widely used during early twentieth century during World War I, and 
was later employed to describe the persuasive tactics of totalitarian regimes (Pratkanis & 
Aronson, 1991). Early propaganda scholars Leonard Doob and Edward Robinson defined 
the term as “the employment of non-logical, or affective, appeals in the public 
dissemination and modification of ideas, attitudes, and beliefs” (1935, p. 88). Following 
World War II, the term began to highlight a message’s effect on its receiver. Thus, 
propaganda soon came to denote  “the influence through the manipulation of symbols and 
the psychology of the individual,” or the dissemination of “a point of view with the 
ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal come to ‘voluntarily’ accept a position 
as if it were his or her own” (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991, p. 9).  
What differentiates propaganda from other forms of coercion or persuasion is that 
an individual conceives their response to be of their own decision — in other words, “it 
controls without occasioning antagonistic emotions” (Biddle, 1931, p. 283). Hence, 
propaganda is considered as a method of emotional conditioning that occurs without the 
individual’s recognition (Biddle, 1931). Edward Bernays — a pioneer of propaganda 
studies — referred to this phenomenon as an “invisible government” (1928, p. 9). Beyond 
merely shaping attitudes and beliefs, it is generally accepted that propagandists intend to 
eventually have these attitudes lead to some form of action that will strengthen their 
ideology or mission (Biddle, 1931; Doob & Robinson, 1938; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991; 
Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).  
 In order for propaganda to be effective, there are certain elements that must be 
present within the final disseminated message. Professor of propaganda, William Biddle 
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has narrowed these requirements into the following four rules: a propagandist must avoid 
any possibility for an argument, and instead appeal directly to the receiver's emotions; 
next, the message needs to be placed inside a context that emphasizes the contention 
between “us” and “the enemy,” especially if the message addresses an unresolvable 
conflict of morality; the third rule requires propaganda to be directed towards a particular 
social group, rather than directly targeting individuals; lastly, the true voice behind 
propaganda should remain unidentified whenever possible, or kept anonymous through 
the message’s affiliation with a larger entity (1931).  
 The messages featured in propaganda are presented in numerous ways and 
contain an assortment of persuasive tactics. These messages are usually interwoven with 
cultural symbols and social values, which carry prestige and thus have a better chance at 
receiving recognition, comprehension, and response from the targeted audience (Doob & 
Robinson, 1938). Propaganda commonly utilizes one or many of the following four 
methods: persuasion, which assumes that an individual's behavior is shaped by his or her 
own ideas; a direct emotional appeal that targets certain sentiments intended to compel an 
individual towards conduct; direct suggestion, which uses repetition of emotionally toned 
ideas to evoke action; and indirect emotional appeal, which presents the propaganda as 
entertainment or news in order to inspire particular behaviors (Biddle, 1931).  
The effectiveness of these methods is enhanced by a variety of tactics. The use of 
factoids — a statement that’s implied to be factual but is unsupported by evidence — is a 
common attribute of propaganda, especially when the latter is directed against entire 
nations (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). Factoids allow propagandists to make frequent and 
false claims without having to be held accountable for whether the statement is true, since 
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factoids are usually large lies that would be impossible to prove as false (Pratkanis & 
Aronson, 1991).  
 Fear has also been an effective tactic of propaganda, especially when it comes to 
motivating an audience to act upon the information being received (Pratkanis & Aronson, 
1991). Based on psychologist Carl Hovland’s learning model of persuasion, Pratkanis 
and Aronson suggest that an individual must feel rewarded at four stages of 
psychological processing in order for a message to truly be persuasive (1991). First, the 
message must be powerful enough to actually scare an audience, while also providing a 
solution that would allow the threat to be overcome (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). The 
audience must also consider the aforementioned action to be effective enough to dispose 
of the threat, but most importantly, it is necessary for them to believe that the suggested 
action can realistically be done (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991).   
In addition to factoids and fear tactics, a method referred to as the granfalloon 
trick has been proven to be equally persuasive. The granfalloon trick functions through 
both cognitive and motivational psychological processes; differences between groups are 
brought to attention in order to create distinct out-groups, while unifying factors among 
members are underscored with the intention of promoting a strong sense of group identity 
(Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). Beyond dividing the world into ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ the 
granfalloon trick provides members a sense of pride and self-esteem by motivating 
individuals to “defend the group and adopt its symbols, rituals, and beliefs (Pratkanis & 
Aronson, 1991, p. 169).  
According to political scientist Manuel Torres, there are three themes found 
throughout most jihadi propaganda. The first is a political theme that stresses the 
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importance of establishing an Islamic state that can place religious values at the center of 
society and state affairs (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006).  In order to obtain this 
political reality, sympathizers are encouraged to support the removal of Western-
supported regimes to ultimately end the West’s corruptive influence in Muslim countries 
(Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). The second is a religious theme that can be found 
in most, if not all forms of jihadi propaganda, which reminds supporters of a golden age 
in Islamic societies (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). The imperative need to return 
to a more pure, pious society is emphasized, along with promises for rewards in one’s 
second life and certain victory over enemies due to divine intervention (Torres, Jordán, & 
Horsburgh, 2006). The third and final theme is instrumental, which promotes the 
necessary actions in order to arrive at an ideal political and religious society (Torres, 
Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). Believers are directed to use force against Western 
oppressors in order to restore the reputation of Islam, even if it entails certain death by 
suicide bombing (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006).  
No matter how persuasive a propagandist may be in promoting action among an 
audience, the decision to do so still belongs to the individual. Terrorists often justify their 
violent acts by making claims that they are performed for “a higher societal need, which 
can be understood in the context of social cognitive theory” (Weimann, 2008, p.78). 
According to the theory’s author — psychologist Albert Bandura — one may be 
emotionally impacted by the content they’re consuming, but they are in no way “just 
reactive organisms shaped and shepherded by environmental events or inner forces” 
(2001, p. 266). Instead, behavior is derived from a combination of personal agency and 
sociostructural influences that promotes self-development, adaptation, and change 
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(Bandura, 2001). Because this capacity for self-regulation “operates partially through 
internal standards and evaluative reactions to one’s own behavior,” one may be motivated 
to act due to “the anticipated self-satisfaction gained from fulfilling valued standards and 
evaluative reactions” that stem from performing a particular action (Bandura, 2001, p. 
268). This is especially true when it comes to moral behaviors. There are two aspects of 
moral agency that every individual experiences, one inhibitive and the other proactive 
(Bandura, 2001). The inhibitive form is of particular interest to this study, since it is 
“manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely,” while the proactive is 
demonstrated by humane behavior (Bandura, 2001, p. 268). 
In addition to being self-regulatory, individuals are also capable of self-reflection, 
which allows for the process of thinking, acting, and predicting occurrences that may 
result from their behavior (Bandura, 2001). The adequacy of one’s predictions is then 
judged on how well their thoughts matched with the real outcome, a process referred to as 
thought verification (Bandura, 2001). According to Bandura, there are four modes of 
thought verification: enactive verification, which relies on how well thoughts match up 
with outcomes; vicarious verification, which entails judging the validity of one’s thinking 
with an observation of others’ experiences and behaviors; social verification, which 
involves determining the soundness of their thoughts compared to what others believe to 
be true; and logical verification, which requires individuals to check for fallacies in their 
own thinking, based on previous knowledge (2001).  
Despite an individual’s capacity to self-regulate and self-reflect upon their 
actions, it’s clear that their lives are not entirely autonomous of outside influences. In 
fact, humans are capable of learning from external influences by means of observation 
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(Bandura, 2001). Though this form of learning can occur unintentionally, many human 
values, ideas, and behaviors “can be gained from the extensive modeling in the symbolic 
environment of the mass media” (Bandura, 2001). Observational learning suggests that a 
single model can influence the ideas and behaviors of “countless people in widely 
dispersed locales” (Bandura, 2001, p. 271). With the advent of new technologies such as 
the Internet, once inaccessible ideas, behavior patterns, and values are now being 
disseminated across the globe by symbolic modeling (Bandura, 2001). Individuals are 
thus becoming more influenced by these electronic, symbolic environments, which are 
reconstructing social realities and public consciousness in return (Bandura, 2001).  
Surely, there are many social benefits to be derived from the popularization of 
electronic technologies, but these new systems of communication also come with costs 
(Bandura, 2002). The components that make new technologies like the Internet so 
wonderful — its anonymity, absence of censorship, and broad scope — can also be 
abused for more sinister purposes. In fact, the nature of the Internet may serve as an ideal 
platform for moral disengagement to occur among groups and individuals (Rubin, 1994). 
Bandura identifies eight psychosocial mechanisms of moral disengagement that are found 
to function in political, military, and terrorist operations (2004).  The first is moral 
justification, or the process of making violent behavior “personally or socially acceptable 
by portraying it as serving socially worthy and moral purposes” (Bandura, 2004, p. 124). 
There is also the use of advantageous comparison, which contrasts an amoral behavior 
with the reprehensible act of another in order to give the impression that one’s own action 
is less inhumane, or even righteous (Bandura, 2004). Displacement of responsibility 
allows one’s actions to be perceived as “stemming from the dictates of authorities rather 
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than from their own responsibility” (p. 130), while diffusion of responsibility causes an 
amoral behavior to be perceived as only a small contribution to a larger function or 
collective mission (Bandura, 2004). A fifth mechanism, the use of euphemistic language, 
entails the use of sanitized language to describe violent acts as being less socially deviant 
than they actually are (Bandura, 2004). Attribution of blame, which may be the most 
popular mechanism among terrorists, involves the violent perpetrator identifying as an 
innocent victim who has been “driven to extreme means by forcible provocation rather 
than acting on a deliberative decision” (Bandura, 2004, p. 134). The final two 
mechanisms, disregard or distortion of harmful consequences and dehumanization, both 
function through the process of denial. Disregard of harmful consequences entails 
ignoring, minimizing, or distorting the effects of one’s actions on a victim, while 
dehumanization depicts the victim as being subhuman, and thus justifies the perpetrator’s 
inhumane treatment (Bandura, 2004).  It’s evident that some, if not all, of these eight 
mechanisms of moral disengagement would have to be utilized by terrorists in order to 
legitimize actions like suicide bombings, hijackings, or killing of any kind (Bandura, 
2004). What’s of critical concern is that messages containing these mechanisms are now 
being diffused among large audiences of Internet users, whose social realities may 
subsequently be shaped by such ideas, values, and behaviors. 
Some scholars would argue that Bandura’s theory of observational learning fails 
to account for other potential factors that could motivate violent behavior. Many who 
study Islamic-inspired terrorism point to on-the-ground, environmental factors to explain 
an individual’s motivation for carrying out atrocities. In the case of Salafi Jihadism, these 
external motivators are often linked to the economic and social state of the individual’s 
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home country (Simon, 2003). Problems range from low economic mobility, poor 
schooling, political corruption, warfare, unsustainable urban growth, and diminishing 
environmental resources (Simon, 2003). Many of the countries that harbor al-Qaeda 
affiliates are also absent of robust civil societies, which makes effective and lasting 
political change a serious challenge for a discontent public (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). 
Violence is thus an increasingly popular way to garner attention to one’s cause and 
political motivations. An individual may also be drawn to violent Salafi Jihadism due to 
their proximity to radical religious leaders and organizations (Krieger & Meierrieks, 
2011). Because most of these organizations operate out of local mosques, radical 
ideology is easily disseminated throughout particularly conservative Salafi 
neighborhoods.  
Despite the latter environmental factors, which could potentially lead an 
individual to accept Salafi Jihadism, Bandura’s theories of observational learning and 
moral disengagement remain relevant to this study. Because the analysis’ sample will 
only include English content, the target audience is presumably one well beyond the 
reach of the aforementioned regional factors. The radicalization of an individual’s 
behavior is thus more likely to be caused by online Salafi Jihadist content, rather than 
being spurred by environmental factors.  
 
Al-Qaeda’s Online Presence 
With the invention of the high-speed printing press in the 19
th
 century came the 
ability to disseminate ideas to a very large audience in a short amount of time. Since then, 
the reach and speed of mass media has exponentially improved with the later advents of 
JIHAD IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AL-QAEDA’S DIGITAL  
 
 
23 
 
radio, television, and the Internet. Any innovations in information dissemination have 
been learned, utilized, and occasionally abused by various institutions with a message to 
share among the public (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).  Media have played an increasingly 
important role in terrorists’ activities, especially since it allows groups to exert 
psychological impacts across a wide audience (Weimann, 2006). From its inception, al-
Qaeda has recognized the importance of maintaining an active media presence in order to 
attract sympathizers to its cause (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006; Rogan, 2007).  
According to the late al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, the group’s focus extends far 
beyond shaping society and politics. On numerous occasions, the Salafi leader stressed, 
“communication is 90 percent of the struggle” (Jenkins, 2011). This statement alone may 
explain why al-Qaeda and its affiliates so quickly embraced the Internet. The medium has 
allowed a threatened on-the-ground organization to transform into an organic social 
movement, which is accessible to anyone with an Internet connection (Brachman, 2006). 
Al-Qaeda’s first phase of digital propaganda was drastically different when 
compared to the content being produced today. Information was mainly shared among 
already existing sympathizers in the form of communiqués, which consistently featured 
Osama Bin Laden as the movement’s lead protagonist (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 
2006). The communiqués often included demands directed towards members or potential 
recruits, while providing little explanation or insight into any of al-Qaeda’s pending 
projects (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). The most notable difference found within 
first-phase propaganda is that responsibility was never claimed for any of the group’s 
activities; instead, responsibility for the 1998 attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania were claimed by a fictitiously named group — the Islamic Army for the 
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Liberation of the Holy Places (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). In the years directly 
following 9/11, al-Qaeda directed its attention towards major newspapers and new 
channels for propagating its cause (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). In many ways, 
the group took advantage of the world’s newly founded curiosity in Osama Bin Laden 
and his supporters, which brought weekly opportunities for international exposure 
(Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). It was also around this time that al-Qaeda 
published their first website — Al Neda — that featured an array of content ranging from 
jihadi news to technical instructions on how to wage jihad online (Torres, Jordán, & 
Horsburgh, 2006). As media attention began to lessen, al-Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadist 
groups started to steadily increase their online presence, until most of the groups’ 
propaganda was only diffused online (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). Five years 
after 9/11, the number of jihadist websites mushroomed from the single digits to the 
thousands (Awan, 2007; Jenkins 2011), hundreds of which are in English (Jenkins, 2011). 
The steady development of English websites is especially important, since they’ve been 
found to serve as the primary inspiration to commit terrorist attacks among diasporic 
communities (Atran, 2005; Awan, 2007).  
The fact that al-Qaeda heavily relies on the Internet shouldn’t come as a surprise, 
despite the group’s adamant claims to reject any form of Western modernity or 
technology (Weimann, 2006). This existential contradiction only underscores the 
importance of the Internet in the promotion and survival of al-Qaeda and its affilliates’ 
mission. The medium simply provides too many tempting advantages to be ignored. The 
clearest advantage is that the Internet transcends national borders, which allows al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates to reach a once inaccessible, international audience (Conway, 2006; 
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Bhui, 2013; Atwan, 2007; Weimann, 2008).  Additional advantages of the Internet 
include the low costs of maintaining an online presence, its absence of censorship, the 
option of remaining anonymous, and its interactivity (Conway, 2006; Atwan, 2007; 
Weimann, 2008).   
Beyond adding legitimacy and control over their Salafi Jihadist mission, the 
Internet also aids al-Qaeda and its affiliates in recruiting new supporters both regionally 
and abroad (Brachman, 2006; Weimann, 2010; Jenkins, 2011; Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013; 
Torok, 2013). The constant surveillance and targeting of terrorist training camps has 
provided al-Qaeda no choice but to adopt new training and recruitment strategies, which 
are now carried out online (Torok, 2013). This shift in the group’s recruitment strategy 
has allowed al-Qaeda to attract a new audience of sympathizers that are often tech-savvy 
youths (Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006; Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013). This cohort is 
especially vulnerable to Salafi Jihadists’ propaganda efforts, since many have been 
“influenced in their collective identity formation by various theological and political 
perspectives found online” (Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013). The attractiveness of group identity 
is an important and concerning factor when it comes to recruitment and radicalization, 
since the Internet allows for polarization that can lead to increases in opinion extremity 
and the normalization of extreme behaviors (Torok, 2013). The Internet provides an ideal 
environment for the creation of extremist groups, which could potentially lead to 
increased self-enlistment and the emergence of new cells (Cilluffo, Cardash, & 
Whitehead, 2007). 
In addition to resonating with a younger demographic, the Internet has also 
diversified and broadened the scope of al-Qaeda’s influence. As previously noted, there 
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has been an increase in Salafi Jihadist websites targeting Western English speakers 
(Jenkins, 2011).  Much of al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ propaganda encourages homegrown 
terrorism, and provides individuals with access to the information and materials needed 
in order to carry out lone wolf operations in their own countries (Thompson, 2011). 
Westerners drawn to the Salafi Jihadist cause are especially useful for transporting 
materials and acting as suicide bombers since they already reside within the target 
country’s borders (Thompson, 2011). Keeping today’s heightened security measures in 
mind (especially when it comes to entering a foreign country), Westerners are clear 
strategic assets to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Previous research has analyzed content 
directed towards Western audiences by studying al-Qaeda’s most notorious digital 
magazine — Inspire. Throughout his analysis, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins found that 
the magazine targets male, English-speaking young adults through an emphasis on taking 
action, rather than Islamic theology (2011). Inspire contains explicitly violent messages 
that include how to properly build a bomb, carry out successful kidnappings, or how to 
safely clean a Kalashnikov rifle (Jenkins, 2011). This hyper-masculinized, violent content 
is intended to appeal directly to “an audience of angry young men looking for meaning, 
hankering for status, and seeking adventure” (Jenkins, 2011, p. 16).  
Additional research focusing on jihadists’ online presence include studies of 
online forums and chat rooms (Awan, 2007; Janbeck, 2011), websites and social media 
pages (Thomas, 2003; Awan, 2007; Weimann, 2010; Janbeck, 2011; Thompson, 2011; 
Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013; Torok, 2013), digital or printed texts (Torres, Jordán, & 
Horsburgh, 2006; Jenkins, 2011), multimedia content (Rogan, 2007; Torres, Jordán, & 
Horsburgh, 2006; O’Saughnessy & Baines, 2009), and technological tools such as special 
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web browsers and software that can be used to encrypt data and IP address destinations 
(Thomas, 2003). This study intends to build upon this growing body of research by 
examining al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ appeals to Westerners in the form of online texts 
created in the years following 9/11. 
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CHAPTER 3 – METHOD 
Content analysis has been defined as “a methodology that utilizes a set of 
procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber, 1985, p. 9). Through analysis, 
inferences can be made about “the sender of the message, the message itself, or the 
audience of the message” (Weber, 1985, p. 9). Specifically, qualitative content analysis is 
intended to both document and understand the meaning behind communication, while 
also allowing relevant, theoretical relationships to be discovered and verified (Altheide, 
1996). The main purpose to conduct a qualitative content analysis is to “captur[e] 
definitions, meanings, processes, and types…used to supplement understanding and 
interpretation derived from other data as well” (Altheide, 1996). Content analysis can be 
used for a variety of purposes (Weber, 1985), but this study will pay particular attention 
to detecting the existence of propaganda, revealing the focus of the group responsible for 
disseminating the information, and to describe particular trends found within the 
collected content.  
According to Weber, there are a number of advantages to conducting a content 
analysis when compared to other methods of data gathering and analysis. First, 
communication lies at the core of social interaction between individuals and groups; 
another is that content that has existed for stretching spans of time can be accessed and 
analyzed in order to expose cultural indicators; and finally, cultural indicators can then be 
used to assess changes that have occurred socially, politically and culturally over time 
(1985). 
In the interest of establishing whether the content provided by Salafi Jihadists is 
intended to propagate radicalization, this study analyzed a variety of online texts that 
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have been created or translated into English by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Due to 
language barriers and lack of access to sensitive content (which tends to disappear as 
quickly as it becomes accessible online), convenience sampling was utilized for this 
study. Sample content was retrieved from a variety of online sources, including the 
jihadist-affiliated Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum, jihadist archival websites such as 
Jihadology.net, and broader Internet archive searches. The sample was comprised of 250 
textual, digital communications produced by al-Qaeda central and five of its affiliates, 
which include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Shabaab, and the 
Taliban. The entire textual form of communication — ranging from digital magazines, 
speech or video transcripts, and articles — served as the study’s unit of analysis.  
Al-Qaeda’s digital sophistication was underscored in 2009 by the premiere of 
their first online publication, Defenders of the Truth, which was later followed by the 
widely disseminated Inspire magazine. Both of these digital magazines serve as 
prototypes for content produced by the group and its affiliates today (Jenkins, 2011). 
Because this study intends to analyze Salafi Jihadists’ increasing reliance on digital forms 
of media, all units of analysis dated from 2009 to the present. Sampling content that has 
been published from 2009 onward allowed the analysis to highlight al-Qaeda and similar 
groups’ global media campaigns as they currently exist —highly decentralized with many 
contributors producing content that propagates their Salafi Jihadist ideology.  
Content was coded as either propagating radicalization or not, depending on 
whether it contains any of the following eight mechanisms of Albert Bandura’s theory of 
moral disengagement: moral justification, euphemistic labeling, advantageous 
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comparison, displacement and diffusion of responsibility, distortion of consequence, 
dehumanizing victims and attribution of blame.  Possible implications of individuals’ 
exposure to messages containing mechanisms of moral disengagement are explored 
through the application of social cognitive theory.  
 For the purpose of measurement, Bandura’s eight mechanisms are defined as the 
following:  
Moral justification: The justification of violence by “cognitively redefining the 
morality of killing, so that it is free from self-censuring restraints” (Bandura, 2004, p. 
124). In the case of jihad, violence is depicted as a religious duty justified by Muslims’ 
obligation to expand and secure Dar al-Islam (Okon, 2013; Sagemen 2004). 
Advantageous comparison: The presentation of “reprehensible acts as being 
righteous” by means of comparison with “more flagrant contrasting inhumanities” 
(Bandura, 2004, p.127). For example, terrorists tend to downplay the amoral nature of 
their actions by claiming jihad as their only means of defense to “curb the widespread 
cruelties inflicted on their people under tyrannical regimes” (Bandura, 2004, p. 127). 
Displacement of responsibility: Actions are seen as “stemming from the dictates 
of authorities rather than from their own responsibility’ (Bandura, 2004, p.130). Despite 
the fact that violence is in no way included in Islamic religious code, clerics are often 
responsible for condoning jihad (Bandura, 2004), thus allowing for individuals to claim 
obedience to a religious authority’s orders as a reason for carrying out attacks.  
Diffusion of responsibility: An action is depicted as a subfunction of a greater, 
communal enterprise; responsibility is thus diffused among the entire group rather than 
being placed upon the individual (Bandura, 2004).  External jihad is defined as a 
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collective obligation of all Muslims to secure their Islamic umma (Gould, 2005; Okon, 
2013; Janbek, 2011). The responsibility to wage violence upon enemy targets is therefore 
the responsibility of an entire community of believers, not just the individual performing 
the act. 
Euphemistic language: The strategic use of sanitized language to label or describe 
amoral actions (Bandura, 2004). The term ‘jihad’ is religious in nature, and is often 
legitimized through references to Islamic texts or the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 
(Lewis, 2013; Okon, 2013;). Killing is thus sanitized through pious language, allowing 
for violent acts to appear less inhumane.  
Disregard or distortion of consequences: Minimizing, distorting, or ignoring the 
effects of an action’s consequences upon victims (Bandura, 2004).  Jihad waged against 
nonbelievers is often depicted as a divine duty. Following an attack, the jihadist’s 
martyrdom is recognized and celebrated, while the victims are rarely mentioned 
(Sageman, 2004).  
Attribution of blame: Placing blame on adversaries or compelling circumstances; 
the perpetrator depicts themselves as “faultless victims driven to extreme means by 
forcible provocation rather than acting on a deliberative action” (Bandura, 2004, p.134).  
In the context of Salafi Jihadism, the West is often depicted as provoking violent attacks 
because it condones “oppressive and inhumane social conditions and thwarted political 
efforts” through its support of repressive regimes (Bandura, 2004, p. 135).  
Dehumanization: The victims of violent acts are depicted as inhuman or 
subhuman, and regarded as “insensitive to maltreatment and influenceable only by 
maltreatment” (Bandura, 2004, p. 136).  Victims are commonly referred to as ‘kafirs,’ or 
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nonbelievers, which renders them as infidels from a Salafi Jihadist perspective; a 
frequently cited hadith instructs jihadists to kill any infidel they may encounter, while 
promising rewards on the Day of Resurrection for doing so (Okon, 2013).  
Beyond establishing whether the sampled content is intended to propagate 
radicalization, this study addressed three research questions regarding the use of the 
aforementioned mechanisms. The first and central research question determined which of 
the eight mechanisms are most frequently used throughout Salafi Jihadist propaganda. 
The second examined whether the frequency of employed mechanisms has changed over 
the sample’s time frame. Lastly, content was analyzed to establish whether the frequency 
of the eight mechanisms differs depending on the affiliate group responsible for its 
production.  
Because content has been collected through a non-random sampling technique, 
any conclusions drawn from this analysis will not be inferred upon other sources of jihadi 
media originating from either Shi’ite groups, or smaller Salafi Jihadist organizations that 
are unrecognized by the mainstream, al-Qaeda brand. One exception that has been made 
concerning the latter point is the inclusion of material produced by the Islamic State 
(formerly ISIS). Though Ayman al-Zawahiri — the current leader of al-Qaeda central — 
formally renounced the Levant-based cell in the spring of 2014, the Islamic State was 
established, recognized, and began gaining its prominence in the region as an al-Qaeda 
affiliate. In addition to the fact that the group shares similar Salafi Jihadist motivations 
with al-Qaeda central, the Islamic State is also a leading producer of English, digital 
content when compared to other affiliates. For these reasons, content disseminated by the 
recently disavowed group was included in the study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESULTS 
Due to the inaccessibility of the content being analyzed, this study relied on a 
convenience sample. As a result, the convenience method may have caused the 
frequencies of affiliates, years, and publication formats within the sample to be 
disproportionate. Alternatively, the sample may reflect a broader trend of affiliates’ 
digital communication activities. Of the 250 digital publications, 27.6% were produced 
by AQAP, 23.2% by the Taliban, 17.2% by AQIM, 12.8% by ISIS, 10.8% by al-Qaeda 
Central, and 8.4% by al-Shabaab. While some affiliates regularly disseminate content 
online, others tend to do so less frequently. Thus, digital content produced by the most 
active affiliates is easier to come by than materials created by less active groups. 
Affiliates are also more likely to disseminate content after a successful attack or major 
event within the region, which may explain why materials published in certain years were 
more accessible than others.  A greater portion of the units were published in 2013 
(30.8%), 2011 (24%), and 2014 (20.8%), followed by those produced in 2009 (8.4%), 
2010 (8%) and 2012 (8%). Articles were the most disseminated format, and thus served 
as 65.2% of the 250 units of analysis. Speech transcripts were the second most 
disseminated format, making up 14.8% of the sample, followed by digital magazines 
(12.4%), and video transcripts (7.6%).  The disproportionate frequency of formats within 
the sample may be linked to their production requirements — while single-page articles 
can be produced directly in English, speech and video transcripts often require 
translation. The production of digital magazines requires a broader set of editorial and 
design skills than the latter three formats, which may explain why so few were accessible 
for this study. 
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The first research question examined which of the eight mechanisms of moral 
disengagement was employed most frequently in Salafi Jihadists’ digital content. Of the 
250 units of analysis included within the sample, more than 90% contained one or more 
mechanisms. Euphemistic language was the most frequently employed, appearing in 94% 
of digital publications. The remaining seven mechanisms, ranked in order of their 
frequency, are as follows: attribution of blame, 88.4%; moral justification, 83.2%; 
advantageous comparison, 71.2%; diffusion of responsibility, 66.3%; dehumanization, 
64.4%; displacement of responsibility, 57.6%; and disregard of consequences, 52.8% (see 
Appendix A for a frequency distribution figure).   
 The second research question addressed whether the frequency of employed 
mechanisms had changed over time. Cross tabulation and Pearson’s chi-square test were 
used to explore differences that occurred from 2009 to 2014. The analysis showed that 
there was a notable increase in the employment of moral justification in 2013, χ² (5, 250) 
=17.31, p= .004. Disregard of consequences also experienced an increase in employment 
throughout 2013, χ² (5, 250) =12.796, p= .025.  
 The final research question examined whether the employment of mechanisms 
had differed across affiliates. Each of the eight mechanisms showed significant 
differences in their application across groups. The first significant result concerned the 
groups’ use of attribution of blame, χ² (5, 250) =15.19, p= .010; in this case, the Taliban 
was less likely to employ the mechanism than other affiliates. The results of the 
remaining seven mechanisms were highly significant. Moral disengagement produced a 
highly significant result, χ² (5, 250) =42.912, p= .000, which suggested that the Taliban 
used the mechanism less frequently than others, while al-Qaeda central employed it more 
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frequently. Advantageous comparison also produced a highly significant result, χ² (5, 
250) =38.714, p= .000; while AQAP and al-Qaeda central used the mechanism more 
frequently than others, AQIM and al-Shabaab’s materials contained it less frequently. 
Another highly significant result was found in regard to displacement of responsibility, χ² 
(5, 250) =44.768, p= .000, which suggested that while the Taliban and al-Shabaab used 
the mechanism less often than others, AQAP and AQIM tended to employ it in their 
materials more frequently. Diffusion of responsibility also produced a highly significant 
result, χ² (5, 250) =22.963, p= .000; though ISIS was found to employ the mechanism 
more frequently than others, the Taliban and AQIM were less likely to do so. Affiliates’ 
use of euphemistic language additionally produced a result that was highly significant, χ² 
(5, 250) =23.783, p= .000; once again, the Taliban was the outlier among affiliates when 
it came to the employment of the latter mechanism, using it less often than expected. 
Furthermore, disregard of consequences produced a highly significant result, χ² (5, 250) 
=47.650, p= .000. This result showed that ISIS and al-Qaeda central used the mechanism 
more frequently, while the Taliban used it far less than other affiliates. The final 
mechanism of dehumanization also produced a highly significant result, χ² (5, 250) 
=61.04, p= .000. Similar to the previous mechanism, dehumanization was employed 
more often by ISIS and less often by the Taliban. 
 After discovering unexpected discrepancies between the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
central’s observed versus expected counts of employment, additional frequency analyses 
were used to explore each groups’ application of Bandura’s eight mechanisms. Of the 58 
units of Taliban publications, a surprising 22.4% contained displacement of responsibility 
and disregard of consequences. Dehumanization appeared in only 25.9% of the group’s 
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materials, while diffusion of responsibility was employed in just 39.7% of the units. 
Conversely, al-Qaeda central demonstrated higher frequencies of employment than 
expected. The group was discovered to have used the mechanisms of moral justification 
and euphemistic language in 100% of their digital publications. Attribution of blame and 
advantageous comparison were also frequently employed, appearing in 96.3% of al-
Qaeda central’s materials.   
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CHAPTER FIVE – DISCUSSION 
General Discussion 
 As the United States and its allies continue to combat terrorism across the Middle 
East and parts of Africa, Salafi Jihadist organizations are adapting new methods to 
perpetuate their ideology and recruit new members. The increasing proliferation of digital 
English propaganda underscores a notable shift in the groups’ global strategy. In addition 
to on-the-ground combat, groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS must also wage a battle over 
hearts and minds in order to remain as a significant threat to Western powers. The results 
of this study indicate that the latter form of psychological warfare is largely taking place 
online, where groups encourage potential sympathizers to become active supporters and 
participants of global jihad.  
This study also provides evidence that Salafi Jihadists’ digital content is laden 
with themes of moral disengagement, which are intended to mitigate the unconscionable 
behaviors associated with terrorism. Of all eight mechanisms, euphemistic language was 
employed most often by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This is likely because most 
publications, whether or not they were purposed to recruit and radicalize readers, 
contained some form of sanitized language in regards to violent and amoral actions.  
Additionally, an increase in the employment of two mechanisms — moral 
justification and disregard of consequences — was found to have taken place in 2013. 
The discrepancy found between 2013’s observed and expected counts for both 
mechanisms might be linked to the accessibility of materials published that year. 
However, it’s also worth noting that ISIS began to disseminate materials more regularly 
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in 2013, as they became more of an influential and recognized participant in the Syrian 
conflict. 
The most notable findings of this study concerned the third research question, 
which addressed any changes in the employment of mechanisms among affiliates. Some 
discrepancies between groups’ observed and expected frequencies can be explained by 
the nature of the affiliate and the defining characteristics of their content. For instance, 
moral justification was employed more often by al-Qaeda central than it was by other 
affiliates. In order to mitigate any chances of being tracked and located, the group 
publishes digital content infrequently in comparison to counterparts. Because al-Qaeda 
central is less likely to regularly disseminate materials, most of their digital content is 
intended to reinforce their existence, mission, and use of terror against the West and its 
allies. The mechanism of moral justification, which appeared in 100% of al-Qaeda 
central’s digital publications, allows the group to depict their violent interpretation of 
jihad as a religious duty of pious Muslims seeking freedom from Western interference. 
By pairing moral justification with euphemistic language, the group sanitizes their call 
for attacks by citing jihad as a duty condoned by Islamic texts and the Prophet 
Mohammad.  
The difference discovered among groups’ use of advantageous comparison was 
reflected by four affiliates’ observed versus expected counts of employment. While 
AQAP and al-Qaeda central were found to have used the mechanism more often than 
expected, al-Qaeda’s Africa-based affiliates AQIM and al-Shabaab employed it less. An 
observation concerning content produced by the latter two affiliates may provide some 
context to this finding. Throughout the study, it appeared that both were less likely to 
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make moral or political comparisons between themselves and Western powers. On the 
contrary, AQAP and al-Qaeda central often focused on posing “us” versus “them” 
arguments throughout their digital publications, and thus employed advantageous 
comparison more frequently than other affiliates.  
While exploring the differences in groups’ employment of Bandura’s eight 
mechanisms, it was found that Taliban used them less frequently than originally 
anticipated. Discrepancies in the Taliban’s observed and expected counts of employment 
were found among seven of the eight mechanisms, including moral justification, 
displacement and diffusion of responsibility, euphemistic language, attribution of blame, 
disregard of consequences, and dehumanization. These chi-square test results compelled 
me to run an additional frequency analysis on mechanisms employed by the Taliban. The 
low frequencies of four mechanisms in particular (diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility, disregard of consequences, and dehumanization), supported an observation 
made while coding the group’s materials.  
Compared to other affiliates, the Taliban appeared to be less concerned with 
condoning jihad and recruiting fighters through their digital content. Rather, the group’s 
materials were often used to inform readers about Afghanistan’s political and military 
environments. Of all formats, articles in particular were used to provide context to events 
taking place throughout the country. A number of the group’s digital articles resembled 
white papers, which encouraged readers to support and propagate a Taliban interpretation 
of Afghan politics among their localities. Others were very similar to opinion columns, 
and featured Taliban leaders’ assessments of former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the 
true capabilities of the country’s security forces, and the implications of a bilateral 
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security agreement between American and Afghan forces. As a result, the mechanisms 
that were typically employed to mitigate the immorality of jihadism were used less often 
by the Taliban than they were by other organizations.  
 An additional observation made throughout the analysis concerned al-Shabaab, al-
Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. Though the group produced English publications between 
2009 and 2014, their digital materials were much more limited in comparison to other 
affiliates.  Al-Shabaab’s production of content in other languages seemed sparse as well, 
which may be linked to Somalia’s low Internet penetration rate of 1.5% (Internet World 
Stats, 2013).  However, it would be erroneous to conclude that Internet penetration alone 
is responsible for the group’s meager production of digital content. For example, AQAP 
is based in Yemen, which has a 20% penetration rate (Internet World Stats, 2013). This 
positions it among the three lowest ranking countries across the Middle East, including 
Syria, which has a current rate of 26.2%, and Iraq, where only 9.2% of the population are 
regular Internet users (Internet World Stats, 2013).  Despite Yemen’s modest rate, AQAP 
is considered as al-Qaeda’s leading media arm for the dissemination of both Arabic and 
English digital propaganda — suggesting that a country’s low Internet penetration rate is 
not enough to keep groups from sharing content online. Alternatively, this may imply 
regional disparities in financing, and thus technological resources, among al-Qaeda 
affiliates.  
Over the course of this study, it was also recognized that jihadists’ digital, 
quarterly magazines received the most time, attention, and allocation of funds among all 
forms of publication. Unlike other formats included in the sample, digital magazines were 
unique in the fact that they contained a variety of content due to their length, which 
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averaged 40 pages per issue. Magazine content ranged from both real and mock 
interviews with Salafi and Western leaders, to DIY instructions on how to make lethal 
weapons and successfully carry out violent attacks (see Appendix B for content 
examples). Eulogies of recent martyrs were a hallmark of all digital magazines. The most 
popular formats for these eulogies were in-depth martyr profiles and two-page spreads 
dedicated to photos of the deceased (see Appendix C for a martyr profile example). The 
latter remembrances were rarely somber in tone, and often lauded jihadists as heroes. If 
the martyrs’ victims were mentioned within profiles, they were typically dehumanized as 
infidels or positioned as trophies of a successful attack.  
Though the content of magazines remained consistent across the sample’s span of 
time, a major difference in the quality of writing and design took place between 2009 and 
2014. Compared to 2009 editions of AQAP’s first English digital magazine, Defenders of 
the Truth, publications that followed like Inspire and Azan contained fewer grammatical 
errors, and exhibited more detailed, sophisticated design elements (see Appendix D for a 
comparison of 2009 and 2014 publications). Magazines that were published from 2012 
onward also began to direct readers to social media pages and video hosting platforms, 
which feature content ranging from jihadi music videos to feature-length productions. 
The inclusion of these links may suggest that groups like AQAP and ISIS are now setting 
their sights on a younger, tech-savvy audience for purposes of radicalization and 
recruitment.  
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Implications 
 This study sought to provide additional insight into the propagandistic purposes of 
Salafi Jihadists’ digital materials. Of specific concern was whether the groups’ digital 
publications contained themes of Bandura’s eight psychosocial mechanisms of moral 
disengagement. By employing these themes within their digital publications, groups like 
al-Qaeda intend for readers to not only accept their Salafi Jihadist ideology, but to act on 
it as well. If the Internet now serves as an electronic, symbolic environment that can 
potentially reconstruct an individual’s social realities and public consciousness, the 
dissemination of such materials could successfully lead to the radicalization and eventual 
recruitment of individuals. This certainly isn’t to say that anyone exposed to such content 
is likely to accept an ideology that demands participation in violent, global jihad. 
However, the few individuals that may in fact subscribe to these once inaccessible 
ideologies and behaviors are enough to pose unprecedented security concerns for the 
United States and its allies. By effectively radicalizing and recruiting Westerners, Salafi 
Jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS gain an indispensible weapon in their arsenal of 
tactics — loyalists capable of travelling throughout Western countries without having to 
obtain visas or forged passports. For this reason alone, Western fighters are recognized as 
unparalleled assets among jihadist organizations. 
A clear limitation of this study was the inaccessibility of al-Qaeda and similar 
groups’ digital materials. Though Internet archives, jihadist forums, and jihadist-
monitoring websites provided an ample amount of digital publications, links were often 
removed or broken after they were flagged as sensitive content. Because of this, the study 
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used convenience sampling, which may imply that the findings are less representative 
than they would be if drawn from a random sample. 
 Language was another limitation to this study. While there were plenty of 
English materials produced by Salafi Jihadists to draw from, a meta-analysis of content 
across a variety of languages would be ideal in order to gain a greater understanding of 
global jihadist campaigns. Additionally, the materials analyzed in this study were strictly 
textual, which resulted in a wealth of multimedia content being omitted from the sample. 
Though previous studies have analyzed jihadists’ multimedia content, ISIS’ recent 
campaign alone warrants further research. Future studies of this kind could benefit from 
the analysis of videos’ aesthetics, symbolism, intended audience, and effectiveness in 
attracting recruits.  
Bandura’s eight mechanisms may effectively explain the psychosocial processes 
that lead to acts of terror, but one must be judicious when making generalizations about 
the effects of jihadists’ rhetorical appeals — especially when suggesting that digital 
propaganda alone compels individuals to become active jihadists.  However, a recent rise 
of Western jihadists may be indicative of the mechanisms’ high ecological validity as a 
measure of intent to radicalize and recruit individuals online. While potential 
sympathizers within the region may subscribe to Salafi Jihadism because of a number of 
environmental factors, Western recruits are assumingly beyond the reach of such 
influences, and are thus more likely to be motivated to act by groups’ online, rhetorical 
appeals. This would indicate that a certain cohort of readers may be moved to not only 
accept Salafi Jihadists’ ideology, but to join such groups in on-the-ground combat 
throughout the region. 
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Because Salafi Jihadists focus on an external form of jihad, their rhetoric often 
underscores the importance and duties of the group rather than the individual. Though 
diffusion of responsibility defines an individual’s actions as being a subfunction of a 
larger, communal enterprise, it underplays the true significance of jihadists’ collective 
identity. Beyond mitigating an individual’s responsibility for an attack, Salafi Jihadists 
present the notion of belonging to a brotherhood, community of believers, and cell of 
fighters as a recruitment strategy. This is an especially effective propaganda tactic online, 
where youths’ identities are often shaped and influenced by varying political and 
religious perspectives.  For this reason, future qualitative studies should consider creating 
a specific coding category for the theme of collective identity. 
A second rhetorical device that failed to fall within the parameters of Bandura’s 
eight mechanisms was the idealization of an Islamic caliphate. Similar to the utopian 
themes that were fixtures of Soviet propaganda, affiliates portray the Islamic state as 
being a place of Islamic unity and solidarity. The state is depicted to be free of any 
corruptive and unwanted influence, which allows for the rule of Shari’a Law in all 
corners of life. Despite the fact that the caliphate would entail both a political and 
religious state, jihadists’ rhetoric usually omits the political dimension of statehood in 
order to emphasize the spiritual benefits it would bring to the Muslim umma. 
Another dimension of jihadists’ digital campaigning that would be worth 
exploring is their growing presence on social media platforms. It appears that these 
channels of communication are beginning to match, if not rival, jihadist-hosted online 
forums in the recruitment of fighters and the dissemination of digital materials. This type 
of research would be prone to similar challenges of accessibility, but is of increasing 
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importance in today’s political and media landscape. Recruitment and content sharing on 
these platforms will only increase in popularity as the violent subculture continues to 
trend among a digitally connected generation of supporters. 
Future research may also explore the most effective methods for counteracting 
groups’ dissemination of radicalizing materials. This would be especially relevant in light 
of the United States’ response to ISIS’ digital campaign. Following the barrage of media 
attention that the Levant-based group received in the summer of 2014, the U.S. 
Department of State’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) 
launched a digital campaign of their own — “Think Again, Turn Away.” However, rather 
than abstaining from the use of tactics employed by ISIS, the CSCC has frequently 
chosen to combat the group’s images and videos of brutality by sharing similarly violent 
content on websites like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. If Western nations intend to 
steer potential sympathizers from radicalization towards realization, an effective 
counteractive messaging strategy is necessary. This type of study could potentially aid 
countries in constructing campaigns to curb the recent rise of Western recruits who have 
fallen victim to jihadists’ increasingly sophisticated, digital campaigns. 
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APPENDIX A 
Frequency Distribution of Albert Bandura’s Eight Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 
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APPENDIX B 
Features of Digital Magazines 
 
Figure B1 is an example of a hypothetical interview with President Barack Obama.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B2 is an example of DIY instructions for lethal weapons or behaviors. 
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APPENDIX C 
Martyr Remembrance 
 
  
Figure C1 displays a popular format of a martyr remembrance — an in-depth profile of a 
fighter that details his journey as a commander within AQAP.
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APPENDIX D 
Differences in Digital Magazines’ Graphic Sophistication 
 
Figure D1 displays the first English jihadi digital magazine, Defenders of the Truth, published 
in the summer of 2009.  
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Figure D2 displays the Spring 2014 edition of Inspire magazine. 
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